CALD Internship Report

Name of Intern: Amy Hsieh

Country: Taiwan (Democratic Progressive Party)

Internship period: 10 June 2003 – 18 July 2003

Observations and Impressions

I. Democracy in Practice in the EU

Compared to many European countries, Taiwanese society is very new to the practice of democracy. One can say that democracy in Taiwan is energetic and lively, or rather, rambunctious and chaotic. On the other hand, current member countries of the EU have had much more experience with making democracy work. Comparatively, the European Parliament displayed a greater degree of decorum amongst members, respect for procedural rules, and more in-depth, professional knowledge of policy issues in their respective committees.  

I had known before arriving in Brussels that the creation of the EU and in particular the common market was both politically and economically a landmark achievement. However, as I observed the remaining sessions of the European Convention, I was struck by a sense of genuine pride in what had been accomplished toward creating a stronger and more democratic European Union. During an ELDR Group meeting, MEP Andrew Duff reminded his colleagues at the end of his report on the Convention’s progress thus far, “We as politicians are doing honorable work here, and we should be proud of that [paraphrase].” That statement made a lasting impression on me.

While I was in Strasbourg, I had the lucky opportunity to sit in the plenary session on the day that Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi reported to the Parliament. Berlusconi was certainly memorable, but the more than 600 MEPs were likewise unforgettable for the civility and respect for democratic procedure that they demonstrated. When Berlusconi’s remarks likening German MEP Schulz to a “Nazi kapo” sparked an outrage throughout the plenary session (actually, the outrage was much more visible on the side of the room where the socialists, greens and liberals were seated), the commotion which ensued was effectively brought to a close by EP President Pat Cox under 15 minutes, who reminded MEPs that they had to attend to many other important votes scheduled for the rest of the day. Berlusconi may have called the MEPs “tourists of democracy” for their reaction to his speech, but I thought the entire incident was a great illustration of respect for democracy. It showed that a mature democracy not only allows for civil and organized expressions of dissent (MEPs expressed their disapproval of Berlusconi’s remarks by repeatedly hitting their desks and raising their hands to speak), but also exists primarily to pass legislation for the betterment of people’s welfare, and not to engage in endless name-calling and bickering.

II. Transatlantic Relations and European Foreign Policy

I arrived in Brussels at an interesting point in EU-USA relations. The US-led war in Iraq had recently ended and now both sides of the Atlantic were making obvious efforts – at least rhetorically – to repair the rift that had formed between them. EU leaders and American leaders alike repeatedly stressed the importance of the EU-USA relationship,[1] citing common values, interests and threats, despite an array of other differences that ranged from the historical and geographical to the political and economic. In the Parliament, members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs debated and passed a resolution affirming the significance of the transatlantic relationship. Although many MEPs remained very critical of US foreign policy and would make occasional humorous stabs at American culture in general, overall I observed a growing opinion that EU-USA cooperation is strategically necessary and far more valuable and sensible than European opposition to the USA.

At the European Council Summit in Thessaloniki (June 2003), Javier Solana, EU’s High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), presented what could be considered the EU’s new security strategy. Solana identified terrorism, proliferation of WMD, and failed states as the three main threats to European security, similar to the threats outlined in the USA’s National Security Strategy presented in September 2002. The means to counter these threats are multilateralism and “pre-emptive engagement,” Solana asserted. “The best protection of our security is a world of well-governed democratic states...Trade and development policies can be powerful tools for promoting reform...Pre-emptive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future.”

Many argued that that the EU, due to its comparative military weakness, has no other choice but to pursue engagement policies and adopt a multilateral approach to international conflicts. Others pointed to ideological reasons, Europe’s historical war experiences, its perception of the magnitude of threats, its perception of US power, or the range of its real interests. Regardless of this array of explanations, one apparent consensus was that Europe as a whole must become stronger and more unified if it is to carry any weight internationally. If the divisions within Europe left over by the war in Iraq were left to grow, Europe would only lose political influence with respect to the US. Only a stronger Europe can both work with America as an effective partner and keep American power in check. To this end, efforts were underway to make the EU’s CFSP and ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy) more coherent and substantive, such as creating a more unified EU Foreign Affairs structure and increasing spending on defense. The role of NATO, on the other hand, continued to play a necessary yet ambiguous role in the transatlantic relationship. (See Appendix for notes on these subjects.)

In Solana’s strategic blueprint for the EU, the concept of “pre-emptive engagement” was particularly noteworthy because it echoed the USA’s “pre-emptive” strategic outlook, but advocated trade and development policies instead of military action as the primary means of dealing with these threats. I found this contrast between the European and American approaches to countering threats pre-emptively particularly interesting because it highlighted the importance of development policies in any comprehensive, long-term security strategy. If poverty and unstable societies are fertile grounds for breeding terrorism – one of the main security threats to the EU and USA – then more resources and attention must be devoted to addressing these development issues.

In the past, the EU – especially its Scandinavian members – has generally shown greater commitment to sound development policies in the Third World than the US. However, this summer President Bush pledged 15 billion US dollars over the next five years to fight AIDS in poor countries, certainly no small amount and well-received by NGOs and political commentators, despite misgivings about his plan’s feasibility and dependability. In addition, he had presented in February plans for a “Millennium Challenge Account” which would provide the largest increase in U.S. development assistance since the Marshall Plan and by 2006 would represent a 50% increase in the 2002 level of US development assistance funding. The question of who really was more committed to development in the Third World – the EU or the US – was brought to center stage and each side accused the other of spending too little on African and Latin American development. Even trade issues such as farm subsidies were criticized in the context of harming the agricultural production of African countries and thus exacerbating the development gap.

Granted, this could all be dismissed as mere political rhetoric. However, if common security threats such as terrorism and failed states are being contextualized in a framework of wealth inequalities and modern societal development (rather than a framework grounded in a “clash of civilizations” theory), then there seems to exist potential and momentum to push for substantially increased commitment to development issues in the Third World. Granted, it has never been possible to completely separate development policies and foreign aid from a country’s political, strategic or economic interests. Thus, if these “new threats” are provoking policy-makers to take a closer look at the socio-economic conditions in lesser developed and developing countries, then advocates of these countries and those who are genuinely concerned about development in the Third World – for moral or whatever other reasons – should seize this opportunity and take advantage of this newly evolving discourse.

Suggestions for future Interns >>